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Statutory Liens--1966 Amendment
of Section 67 of the
Bankruptcy Act
By LAWRENCE P. KING*
I. INTRODUCTION
Prior to the 1966 amendments to the Bankruptcy Act,' sub-
divisions (b) and (c) of section 67 were two parts of the statute
which were difficult to interpret. In essence, subdivision (b) pro-
vided for the continuing validity of statutory liens in a bankruptcy
proceeding whether or not such liens were within the prohibitive
voidable preference provisions of section 60 of the Act.2 It was
not possible, however, to look solely to subdivision (b), but it was
also necessary to consider subdivision (c), which provided that
almost all statutory liens given validity were rendered invalid and
ineffective against a trustee in bankruptcy.3 Essentially the only
* Lawrence P. King is Professor of Law at New York University School of
Law, co-author of Duesenberg & King, Sales and Bulk Transfers Under the U.C.C.
and revising editor of Collier on Bankruptcy (14th ed.), and a member of the
New York and Supreme Court Bars.
I Pub. L. No. 89-495, 89th Cong., 2d. Sess. §§ 1-4 (July 5, 1966).
2 Bankruptcy Act § 67(b) read as follows:
The provisions of section 60 of this Act to the contrary notwithstanding,
statutory liens in favor of employees, contractors, mechanics, landlords,
or other classes of persons, and statutory liens for taxes and debts owing
to the United States or to any State or any subdivision thereof, created
or recognized by the laws of the United States or of any State, may be
valid against the trustee, even though arising or perfected while the
debtor is insolvent and within four months prior to the filing of the
petition initiating a proceeding under this Act by or against him. Where
by such laws such liens are required to be perfected and arise but are
not perfected before bankruptcy, they may nevertheless be valid,
if perfected within the time permitted by and in accordance with the
requirements of such laws, except that if such laws require the liens to
be perfected by the seizure of the property, they shall instead be per-
fected by filing notice thereof with the court.
3 Bankruptcy Act § 67(c) read as follows:
Where not enforced by sale before the filing of a petition initiating a
proceeding under this Act, and except where the estate of the bankrupt
is solvent: (1) though valid against the trustee under subdivision b of
this section, statutory liens, including liens for taxes on debts owing to
(Continued on next page)
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types of statutory liens granted full recognition in bankruptcy were
liens on real property and those on personal property if the
lienor had possession. With one exception, all other types of
statutory liens were rendered invalid against a trustee in bank-
ruptcy; the exception was provided for statutory liens for rent and
federal taxes, which were recognized but subordinated to the first
two priorities of section 64 (a).4
Even though subdivisions (b) and (c) of section 67 referred
solely to statutory liens, the Bankruptcy Act did not provide a
definition, although it did provide some non-exhaustive examples
in subdivision (b). An even more difficult problem was present in
the earlier version because of the subordination feature of federal
tax liens and liens for rent in subdivision (c). It was a problem of
circuity and was resolved in three different ways by various courts.5
II. DEFINITION OF STATUTORY LIEN
The 1966 amendments have attempted to deal with all these
problems and provide a statutory solution. First, section 1 of the
(Footnote continued from preceding page)
the United States or to any State or any subdivision thereof, on personal
property not accompaned by possession of such property, and liens,
whether statutory or not, of distress for rent shall be postponed in pay-
ment to the debts specified in clauses (1) and (2) of subdivision a
of section 64 of this Act and such liens for wages or for rent shall be
restricted in the amount of their payment to the same extent as provided
for wages and rent respectively in subdivision a of section 64 of this Act;
and (2) the provisions for subdivision b of this section to the contrary
notwithstanding, statutory liens created or recognized by the laws of any
State for debts owing to any person, including any State or any subdivi-
sion thereof, on personal property not accompanied by possession, of or
by levy upon or by sequestration or distraint of, such property, shall not
be valid against the trustee: Provided, however, That so much of clause(1) of this subdivision c as restricts liens for wages and rent and clause(2) of this subdivision c shall not ap ly in proceedings under chapter
X of this Act, unless an order shall be entered therein directing that
bankruptcy be proceeded with, or in proceedings under section 77 of
this Act. The court may on due notice order so much of any lien in
excess of the restricted amount under clause (1) and any lien invalid
under clause (2) of this subdivision c to be preserved for the benefit of
the estate and, in any such event, such lien for the excess and such
invalid lien, as the case may be, shall pass to the trustee.
4 Bankruptcy Act § 64(a) (1) and (2) lists the first two priorities as adminis-
tration expenses and wage claims limited in amount and time of accrual. All of
the priorities in § 64(a) are paid from the general estate after secured creditors
have been satisfied.
5 E.g., New Orleans v. Harrell, 134 F.2d 399 (5th Cir. 1943). Contra, In reQ~uaker City Uniform Co., Inc., 238 F.2d 155 (3d Cir. 1956); and for a third order
o distribution, California State Dep't of Employment v. United States, 210 F.2d
242 (9th Cir. 1954); In re American Zyploptic Co., Inc., 181 F. Supp. 77(E.D.N.Y. 1960); In re Empire Granite Co., 42 F. Supp. 450 (M.D. Ga. 1942).
See 4 Couaan, BANrmuTrcy f67.2713] (14th ed. 1954).
KmqTucKy LAw JouNALV
Act has been amended to define a statutory lien.6 By inserting sub-
division 29 (a) in section 1, a statutory lien is defined to be
a lien arising solely by force of statute upon specified cir-
cumstances or conditions, but shall not include any lien pro-
vided by or dependent upon an agreement to give security,
whether or not such lien is also provided by or is also
dependent upon statute and whether or not the agreement
or lien is made fully effective by statute.7
This definition is of value not only because of its insertion but
also because the important substantive and operative provisions
of subdivisions (b) and (c) of section 67 refer solely to the
statutory lien. It is of even greater importance because there were
situations where courts had difficulty differentiating between
statutory and consensual liens." Clearly the consensual lien is not
encompassed within the operative effects of subdivisions (b) and
(c) of section 67. By the same token, the statutory lien is not
within the operative effects of section 60 of the Bankruptcy Act.9
In those few instances where difficulty arose, the courts tended to
treat some types of consensual liens as statutory liens. Now, by
definition, a statutory lien is one arising solely by force of statute.
Many of the consensual type liens, while arising by force of agree-
ment rather than by force of statute, are specifically and in detail
regulated by other statutes. Examples of these liens include the
chattel mortgage, the factor's lien, and a security interest under
6 Bankruptcy Act § 1(29a) as amended, Pub. L. No. 89-495, 89th Cong.,
2d Sess. § 1 (July 5, 1966).
7 Ibid.
8 See In re Quaker City Uniform Co., Inc. (3d Cir. 1956) (first opinion, not
officially reported), wherein the court stated that § 67(c)
also postpones the liens of the chattel mortgagees and we cannot agree
with the assumption which apparently has guided the parties in this
appeal that the liens of the chattel mortgagees are not postponed. The
liens of the chattel mortgagees in this case fit exactly the type of liens
that are postponed in payment by Section 67(c). They are statutory
liens under Pennsylvania law; they are on personal property and were
not accompanied by possession.
This opinion was withdrawn and replaced by a later one reported at 238 F.2d
155 (3d Cir. 1956) wherein, on this point, the court (at pp. 158-59) concluded:
It is not necessary to decide whether or not a Pennsylvania chattel mort-
gage is a 'statutory lien' within the meaning of section 67, sub. c....
For the purposes of this opinion, however, we shall assume that it is not
a 'statutory lien' within the purview of section 67.
See also In re Tele-Tone Radio Corp., 133 F. Supp. 739 (D.N.J. 1955), where
the court correctly concluded that liens under Factor s Lien Acts were consensual
and not statutory.
9 Bankruptcy Act § 67(b).
[Vol. 55,
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Article Nine of the Uniform Commercial Code. Even though there
is statutory regulation of almost all consensual liens, the important
factor is that the lien itself does not arise because of, or by virtue
of, the statute itself. It arises solely because of an agreement be-
tween the debtor and the creditor. In the absence of an agreement,
there will not be a consensual lien.
On the other hand, a statutory lien can and will arise in the
absence of an agreement, and it is not dependent upon agree-
ment. As a matter of fact, it presupposes that there is no prior,
contemporaneous, or subsequent agreement between the parties.
The lien arises by operation of law out of some economic rela-
tionship between the parties, and its purpose is to protect a
certain economic group.'0 Examples include the laborer or
materialman who is given a mechanic's lien, the repairman who is
given a garageman's lien, however termed in local statute, and the
various levels of government which are given statutory liens for
unpaid taxes, provided that necessary procedural steps are taken.
By virtue of the definition now contained in section 1 [29 (a)] of
the Bankruptcy Act, the courts should not have any difficulty
distinguishing between consensual and statutory liens.
In passing, it might be noted that there is a third type of lien,
the judicial lien.:" A judicial lien arises out of judicial pro-
ceedings; examples include the judgment lien, the attachment
lien, and the garnishment lien. As far as the Bankruptcy Act is
concerned, the judicial lien is governed by section 67 (a), which
treats only this subject. It also falls within the provisions of
section 60 and subdivisions (c) and (e) of section 70, since there
is no limiting effect in section 67 (a) which would exclude it from
the latter two sections.'2
10 See 4 COLLMR, BAN MUPTCY 67.20[2] (14th ed. 1954).
"1 A judicial lien is not defined specifically in the Bankruptcy Act, but in §67(a) it is a lien "obtained by attachment; judgment, levy or other legal or
equitable process or proceeding ....
12 Bankruptcy Act § 6(a): judicial liens are invalid if obtained within four
months before the filing o e bankruptcy petition when the debtor was insolvent
or in fraud of the Act's pIso.
Bankruptcy Act §§ 60(a), (b): a judicial lien may also be a voidable prefer-
ence if meeting the requisite elements.
Bankruptcy Act § 70(c): a judicial lien unperfected at the time of the filing
of the petition is invalid against the trustee who has rights of a judicial lien
creditor.
Bankruptcy Act § 70(e): if the judicial lien is voidable by any existing
creditor with a provable claim, the trustee may invalidate it.
1967]
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The definition of statutory lien in section 1 [29 (a)] has parti-
cular relevance to subdivisions (b) and (c) of section 67. Before
any interpretation or application of these subdivisions can be
made, it is first necessary to decide if the particular lien involved
is statutory. Under the 1966 amendment, the first inquiry will be
directed to the definition in order to determine which type lien
is involved. After deciding that the lien is statutory, reference can
be made to subdivisions (b) and (c) of section 67 in order to
determine the lien's validity against a trustee in bankruptcy.
III. AMENDING SECTION 67 (c).
As mentioned earlier, subdivisions (b) and (c) of section 67
were quite difficult to interpret prior to the 1966 amendment.
This was caused by the three-step procedure that had to be follow-
ed in order to make sense out of these two subdivisions. It was
suggested that section 67 (b) completely validated all statutory
liens even though they might satisfy the requirements of section
60 and become a voidable preference. It was also suggested that it
was necessary to look to subdivision (c) in order to determine
which liens were validated, which were invalidated, and which
were validated but subordinated. Prior to 1966, subdivision (c) (1)
stated that statutory liens on personal property not accompanied
by possession, even though such liens were valid under subdivision
(b), were subordinated to the first two priorities of section 64.13
Thus, the first restriction was that a valid statutory lien on per-
sonal property unaccompanied by possession would not be wholly
validated in a bankruptcy proceeding, but would assume in essence
a third priority, after administration expenses and wage claims.
It was important to recognize, however, that even at this point
one could not stop reading the statutory provisions. By going to
subdivision (c) (2), one found that all statutory liens, except
federal tax liens and liens for distress of rent, were invalid against
the trustee. 14 In other words, under subdivision (c) (2) if there
was a state-created statutory lien on personal property not ac-
companied by possession, levy, sequestration, or distraint, such
statutory lien was wholly invalid against the trustee in bank-




ruptcy regardless of subdivisions (b) and (c) (1). Thus, by follow-
ing through from the beginning of section 67 (b) it was found that
the only types of statutory liens on personal property not accom-
panied by possession or levy that would have any validity in bank-
ruptcy proceedings were the federal tax lien and the rent lien.
These two liens were only partially effective since subdivision (c)
(1) subordinated them to the administration expenses and wage
claims which constituted the first two priorities in section 64.15
The 1966 amendments16 changed this situation. The test of
possession was taken out of subdivision (c), and a more detailed
listing of tests was inserted. The new subdivision (c) in section
67 provides:
(1) The following liens shall be invalid against the
trustee:
(A) every statutory lien which first becomes effective
upon the insolvency of the debtor, or upon distribution
or liquidation of his property, or upon execution against
his property levied at the instance of one other than the
lienor;
(B) every statutory lien which is not perfected or en-
forceable at the date of bankruptcy against one acquir-
ing the rights of a bona fide purchaser from the debtor
on that date, whether or not such purchaser exists: Pro-
vided, That where a statutory lien is not invalid at the
date of bankruptcy against the trustee under subdivision
c of section 70 of this Act and is required by applicable
lien law to be perfected in order to be valid against a
subsequent bona fide purchaser, such a lien may never-
theless be valid under this subdivision if perfected with-
in the time permitted by and in accordance Nvith the
requirements of such law: And provided further, That
if applicable lien law requires a lien valid against a
trustee under section 70, subdivision c, to be perfected
by the seizure of property it shall instead be perfected
as permitted by this subdivision c of section 67 by filing
notice thereof with the court;
(C) every statutory lien for rent and every lien of
15 By analyzing the provisions of the former statute, it is seen that every
lien within clause (2) falls within the subordination feature of clause (1); but
the reverse is not true. Clause (1) subordinates all liens, and clause (2) wholly
invalidates most of the same ones except the two mentioned in the text. These
two are subordinated by clause (1).
10Pub. L. No. 89-495, 89th Cong., 2d. Sess. §§ 2-4 (July 5, 1966).
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distress for rent, whether statutory or not. A right of dis-
tress for rent which creates a security interest in property
shall be deemed a lien for the purposes of this subdivision
C.
(2) The court may, on due notice, order any of the afore-
said liens invalidated against the trustee to be preserved for
the benefit of the estate and in that event the lien shall pass
to the trustee. A lien not preserved for the benefit of the
estate but invalidated against the trustee shall be invalid as
against all liens indefeasible in bankruptcy so as to have the
effect of promoting liens indefeasible in bankruptcy which
would otherwise be subordinate to such invalidated lien.
Claims for wages, taxes, and rent secured by liens hereby in-
validated or preserved shall be respectively allowable with
priority and restricted as are debts therefor entitled to priority
under clauses (2), (4), and (5) of subdivision a of section
64 of this Act, even though not otherwise granted priority.
(3) Every tax lien on personal property not accompanied
by possession shall be postponed in payment to the debts
specified in clauses (1) and (2) of subdivision a of section
64 of this Act. Where such a tax lien is prior in right to liens
indefeasible in bankruptcy, the court shall order payment
from the proceeds derived from the sale of the personal pro-
perty to which the tax lien attaches, less the actual cost of that
sale, of an amount not in excess of the tax lien, to the debts
specified in clauses (1) and (2) of subdivision a of section
64 of this Act. If the amount realized from the sale exceeds
the total of such debts, after allowing for prior indefeasible
liens and the cost of the sale, the excess up to the amount
of the difference between the total paid to the debts specified
in clauses (1) and (2) of subdivision a in section 64 of this
Act and the amount of the tax lien, is to be paid to the holder
of the tax lien.
(4) Where a penalty not allowable under subdivision j of
section 57 is secured by a lien, the portion of the lien se-
curing such penalty shall not be eligible for preservation
under this subdivision c.
(5) This subdivision e shall not apply to liens enforced
by sale before the filing of the petition nor to liens against
property set aside to the bankrupt as exempt, nor to liens
against property abandoned by the trustee or unadministered
in bankruptcy for any reason and shall not apply in pro-
ceedings under section 77 of this Act, nor in proceedings
under chapter X of this Act unless an order has been entered
directing that bankruptcy be proceeded with.
[Vol. 55,
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IV. ScoPE OF SECTION 67 (c).
First to be noted is the scope of subdivision (c). Under sub-
division (c) (5) it is clear that section 67 (c) regarding statutory
liens has no application to Chapter X proceedings under the
Bankruptcy Act.17 Prior to the 1966 amendments, while it seemed
clear that this section was not applicable to Chapter X pro-
ceedings, there was case law to the contrary, and the language in
the statute itself was not entirely free from doubt.18 However, by
virtue of the amendment, the doubt has been removed and there
is clearly no application to corporate reorganizations unless a
straight bankruptcy proceeding supercedes it. Thus, the only
provision applicable to Chapter X proceedings with regard to
statutory liens is subdivision (b) of section 67 which validates
such liens against the trustee regardless of whether they might
have fallen within the provisions of section 60 of the Bank-
ruptcy Act.19
In addition, 67 (c) will not apply to any statutory lien on the
bankrupt's exempt property,20 to any liens upon property which
the trustee has abandoned (which he may do usually by order of
the court),21 or to property which for some reason is not ad-
ministered in the bankruptcy proceedings. Section 67 (c) will not
apply to statutory liens which prior to the filing of the petition
have been enforced by a sale of that property. Finally, the statutory
lien and the provisions of subsection (c) with regard to it will
have no application in section 77 proceedings. 22
As far as other proceedings under the Bankruptcy Act are
concerned, including straight bankruptcy within the first seven
17 Chapter X proceedings deal exclusively with corporate reorganizations.
See the Bankruptcy Act §§ 101-276 as discussed in CoLwxa, BANKr-uprcy, vols.
6, 6A.Is In re American Health Studios, Inc., 178 F. Supp. 558 (S.D. Tex. 1959).
(§ 67(c)(1) applicable in Chapter X proceeding to postpone federal tax lien to
administrative expenses even though § 102 of Chapter X expressly makes § 64
and its priority provisions inapplicable.) For criticism of this case and the contra
argument, see 6 Cou.m, B.ANKui-rcy f 1.07[1] (14th ed. 1965). See also 4
CoLLiEm, BAiNnurTcy fI 67.20[8] (14th ed. 1954).
19 Nothing in Chapter X makes § 67(b) inapplicable. Section 67(b) refers
to statutory liens arising "within four months prior to the filing of the petition
initiating a proceeding under this Act.... A Chapter X petition initiates a
proceeding under the Bankruptcy Act.20 The trustee does not succeed to title in a bankrupt's exempt property.
Bankruptcy Act § 70(a).
21 See 4 CoLLima, BAmnurTcy 70.42 (14th ed. 1959).22 Providing for the reorganization of railroads.
1967]
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chapters, if subsection (c) applies, it is necessary to see which
statutory liens are validated, which are invalidated, and which
are subordinated. A quick reading of subsection (c) will im-
mediately show two things. First, the circuity question that came
up prior to this amendment is now resolved by statute. s Secondly,
a prior problem which had been resolved by a decision of the
United States Supreme Court is also resolved by statute. The
statute now provides in section 67 (c) (4) that tax penalties, al-
though part of a tax lien, are still to be governed by section 57;
this provision, in effect, renders them non-allowable claims.2 4
V. TESTS FOR VALIDATION
Finally, it is readily apparent that subsection (c) has been
almost completely reworded.2 5 Under the earlier version of sub-
section (c) a distinction was made between real and personal
property, and a standard of possession was incorporated. However,
according to the Senate Report accompanying the 1966 bill,
a recent reexamination of State lien statutes has shown that
neither the standard of possession nor the distinction between
real and personal property is an entirely satisfactory cri-
terion. Some liens which are genuine property rights are
23 See cases cited in note 5 supra and text under heading "VII Priority
Circuity-How Resolved" infra.
24§ 570) renders penalties imposed for delinquent taxes non-allowable
unless some pecuniary loss can be shown. The federal government argued that
this section applied only to non-liened tax penalties, and when there was a tax
lien including penalties the whole amount was validated under § 67(c) as a lien
claim. The Supreme Court disagreed with this argument and has held that the
penalties, whether or not part of a tax lien, were non-allowable because of §
57(j), thus resolving a pre-existing conflict among the circuits. Simonson v.
Granquist, 369 U.S. 38 (1962). The conflicting lower court decisions are
represented by: United States v. Mighell, 273 F.2d 682 (10th Cir. 1959); Grim-
land v. United States, 206 F.2d 599 (10th Cir. 1953) (liened penalties allowable).
Contra, United States v. Harrington, 269 F.2d 719 (4th Cir. 1959); In re C. J.
Dick Touring Co, 161 F. Supp. 751 (S.D. Tex. 1958), aff'd sub nom. United
States v. Phillips, 267 F.2d 374 (5th Cir. 1959).
25 In addition, § 67(c) now incorporates some of the language of former
§ 67(b). For former § 67(b), see note 2 supra. Section 67(b) was also amended
by the same legislation (note 1 supra) so that it now reads:
The provisions of section 60 of this Act to the contrary notwithstanding
and except as otherwise provided in subdivision c of this section,
statutory liens in favor of employees, contractors, mechanics, or any
other class of persons, and statutory liens for taxes and debts owing to
the United States or to any State or subdivision thereof, created or
recognized by the laws of the United States or any State, may be valid
against the trustee, even though arising or perfected while the debtor
is insolvent and within four months prior to the filing of the petition
initiating a proceeding under this Act by or against him.
(Vol. 55,
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affected and others which were essentially State-created
priorities escape. 26
In order to complement the Bankruptcy Act's system of distri-
bution of assets, the possession standard was eliminated, and there
is now no possessory distinction between real and personal pro-
perty.27 Instead of these tests, the statutory lien is made ineffective
if it falls within the categories specifically set out in paragraphs
(A), (B), and (C) of section 67 (c) (1). These categories include
the following:
1. The Statutory Lien May Invalidate Itself.-If the statutory
lien becomes effective only upon the insolvency of the debtor, or
if there is a liquidation of his property or a provision with similar
effect, paragraph (A) invalidates it. This has nothing to do with a
consensual lien or an agreement that might have particular opera-
tive provisions in the event of insolvency or liquidation of the
debtor. The lien included is one created by a local statute, and it
26 S. REP. No. 1159 on H.R. 136, incorporating H.R. No. 686, 89th Cong.,
2d Sess. (1966), U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 2026-27 (No. 7, Aug. 20, 1966).
See also 4 CoruL=, B u .r,,,. 67.20[3] at 191-92:
The significance of the "inherent differences" in statutory liens on realty
and personalty for the purposes of the subdivision here is by no means
self-evident. The distinction between what is real property and what
is personal property is at best shadowy in many places, as any text
on the law of property will testify; yet the tenuous line that must often
be drawn under § 67c will at times become determinative of substantive
rights, saving something to defray administrative expenses and possibly
to pay a portion of the bankrupt's employees' past earnings if the lien
is held to fall on personal property, otherwise not. Most of the congeries
of liens created by statute not only may attach to real property but fre-
quently are limited to the debtors realty. Landlords liens, by their
very nature, bind only the tenants' personalty, but statutory liens con-
fined to personal property constitute exceptions to the general tenor of
statutory liens. Indeed, while perhaps no verification of this opinion is
possible, it is believed that tax liens and other types of liens (except
landlords' liens) which tend to consume debtors estates by virtue of
their accumulation are generally not liens on bankrupts' personal property
but rather liens agglomerating against land, buildings, fixtures, and such
real assets. Even with respect to liens against the bankrupt's personalty
all statutory liens requiring possession to support them also prevail under
subdivision c, even against debts entitled to a first and second priority,
except, it would seem, liens of distress for rent. Statutory liens on realty
are no more steeped in history nor traditionally sacrosanct than liens
acquired against such property through legal proceedings, rendered
subject to absolute and complete nullification if within the broad, sweep-
ing provisions of §67a. Indeed, it was uncertain whether statutory liens
on any kind of property could be perfected after bankruptcy until the
Act of 1938 expressly so provided in §67b. There would seem to be
neither more iconoclasm nor greater practical difficulty in subordinating
statutory liens on realty to priorities (1) and (2) of §64a than in sub-
ordinating liens on personalty. (Footnotes omitted.)
27 See S. REP. No. 1159, supra note 26.
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arises only when there is an act or occurrence mentioned in
paragraph (A). Essentially, this type of statute is an attempt to
create a state priority which, of course, should not be recognized in
a bankruptcy situation.28 No statutory lien existed prior to the
insolvency of liquidation or was created by the filing of the
petition in bankruptcy. Therefore, since there was no prior
property right, one should not be recognized solely for purposes of
distribution.
2. The Statutory Lien May Be Invalidated by a BFP-A
statutory lien is invalidated if it is not perfected against a bona
fide purchaser by the time the petition in bankruptcy is filed. This
amendment brings back into the Bankruptcy Act a bona fide
purchaser test which on other occasions raised serious problems
that resulted in its elimination. This was particularly true when
the bona fide purchaser test, which was contained in section 60,
was later changed to a judicial lien creditor test by amendment in
1950.29 However, the subsequent bona fide purchaser test is
reactivated and is the standard to be used in order to determine
the validity of the statutory lien.30 If the statutory lien is not
perfected according to the requirements of state law prior to the
filing of the petition so that it is effective against a subsequent
bona fide purchaser, then it will be subject to attack by a trustee in
bankruptcy. Whether a subsequent bona fide purchaser could
have obtained superior rights over those of the statutory lienor is
a matter of state law and reference must be made to it. The
Bankruptcy Act and section 67 (c) do not respond to that question
in any way.
This provision, however, has to be read with paragraph (B)
because a qualifying feature is included therein. It states that, if
the statutory lien is effective against judicial lien creditors and
would not be invalidated by section 70 (c) of the Bankruptcy Act,
28 See S. RFP. No. 1159, supra note 26, at 2027.29 Prior to 1950, § 60 used a bona fide purchaser test to determine the date
of perfection of a transfer of personal property. The inherent difficulty of such
a test was brought to light in Corn Exchange Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. v. Klauder,
318 U.S. 434 (1948), and § 60 was finally amended in 1950 to substitute a judicial
lien creditor test. 64 Stat. 24 (1950). For further discussion, see CoLEM, BANK-
RupTcy UIT 60.37-60.40 (14th ed. 1964).30 Prior to the 1966 amendment § 67(b), (c) did not expressly contain
a test to determine perfection of the statutory lien; presumably the judicial lien




then a further step is required in order to perfect the lien against
bona fide purchasers. If that particular step is taken within the
required time period, the lien will be effective against the trustee
in bankruptcy. It should also be mentioned that under this amend-
ment, if the particular applicable step required for perfection
under state law is a seizure of the property, then instead of re-
quiring seizure after the filing of the petition, it is sufficient if the
lienor files notice of his lien with the bankruptcy court.31 Obvi-
ously, as to this last point, it would be impossible, or at least a
procedural headache, for the lienor to try to seize the property.
Once the petition in bankruptcy has been filed, all property
belonging to the bankrupt comes within the jurisdiction of the
bankruptcy court,32 and in order for the lienor to attempt to re-
claim it, he would have to file a petition asserting his rights. To
obviate the necessity for the filing of a reclamation petition in
order to obtain possession of the property, this provision was in-
serted so that only notice to the bankruptcy court is required and
it will have the same effect as if the property had been seized.
Under this test two things are important. First, it is the
subsequent bona fide purchaser test that is used. Secondly, in a
limited number of situations perhaps, there is a specific cross-
reference made to the application of section 70 (c) of the Bank-
ruptcy Act.33 Once the bankruptcy petition has been filed, the
lienor desiring to assert a statutory lien must make several
determinations. Does he have a statutory lien effective under state
law as against subsequent bona fide purchasers? If not, is it
effective against judgment and judicial lien creditors, and is there
some step under the state statute which he could take, but has not
yet taken, that would perfect the lien against subsequent bona
fide purchasers? If these are affirmatively answered, then the
question becomes, "Is there a time requirement for taking the
necessary action, and has it expired?" If there is a step to be taken
and the time has not expired, then the lienor still has a way of
31This element is taken from the language in former § 67(b). See supra
note 2.32 See, e.g., Bankruptcy Act §§ 2, 70(a); Isaacs v. Hobbs Tie & Lumber
Co., 282 U.S. 734 (1931).3 3 fBankruptcy Act § 70(c) was also amended in 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-495,
89th Cong., 2d Sess. § 5 (July 5, 1966). Among other things it delimits the
trustee's status by providing that he has the rights of a judgment creditor, a
creditor with an execution returned unsatisfied, and a judicial lien creditor, regard-
less of whether such creditor actually exists.
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validating and perfecting his lien. This would fall within the
proviso of paragraph (B), and he would be able to perform any-
thing required, unless it was a seizure of the property. In the
latter event, he should simply file a notice within the proper time
period with the bankruptcy court. Of course, this presupposes
knowledge on his part of the pendency of the bankruptcy action.
If the step required is not seizure, then he should do whatever is
necessary and possible to insure the perfection of his lien.
If certain elements are not present, then the lienholder will
simply be out of luck. For example, if he has not taken steps
necessary, and there is no time left for performance once the
petition has been filed or if the lien is not effective under section
70 (c), then the lien can be invalidated by the trustee in bank-
ruptcy since it is not perfected. The same result obtains where
state law gives subsequent bona fide purchasers a superior right
even though all steps necessary for the creation of the lien have
been taken. If the state law declares the lien created by the parti-
cular statute valid only as against subsequent creditors, including
subsequent judicial lien creditors, then, by omission, the sub-
sequent bona fide purchaser has full protection from the statu-
tory lienor, and the trustee in bankruptcy stands in his shoes.
Under this subsection, the trustee in bankruptcy is given the
status of a subsequent bona fide purchaser.34
3. Rent Liens Invalidated.-Statutory liens for rent and liens
of distress for rent are wholly invalidated against the trustee in
bankruptcy by section 67 (c). This is a marked change from prior
law, which made rent liens valid against the trustee but sub-
ordinated to the first two priorities in section 64.35 The 1966
amendment, however, provides some protection for the rent
lienor by entitling his lien to a fifth priority in section 64 (a).
Section 67 (c) (2) declares that, "Claims for wages, taxes, and rent
secured by liens hereby invalidated . . . shall be . . . allowable
with priority and restricted as are debts therefore entitled to
priority under clauses (2), (4), and (5) of subdivision (a) of
section 64 ... even though not otherwise granted priority."
Under section 64 (a) (5) of the Bankruptcy Act, a fifth priority
34 As to the trustee's status vis-a-vis a federal tax lien, see text at "VIII. Tax
Liens: Trustee As Judgment Creditor" infra.
35 See supra note 3.
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is given to a rent claim if it enjoys that privilege under applicable
state law. The rent priority is limited to the rent that is due for
the actual use of the premises and which was incurred within
three months prior to the date of bankruptcy. The 1966 amend-
ments changed this provision by requiring reference to section
67 (c) (2).36 The relevant language in section 67 (c) (1) and (2)
invalidates the rent lien as a statutory lien, but accords it the
former priority enjoyed under section 64 (a) (5), even though it is
otherwise not granted one. Prior to this amendment, when only
section 64 (a) (5) related to the rent priority, a priority existed only
if the state law recognized one for rent claims. This was the only
instance where the priority provisions of the Bankruptcy Act in-
corporated state-created priorities and allowed them to have any
effect.3 7 If state law did not give a priority to rent claims, then
the fifth priority in the Bankruptcy Act would be immaterial and
have no effect. The landlord in the bankruptcy proceeding would
not have any priority. If he had a lien under state law, it would
be governed by section 67 (c), and if it was a lien for distress of
rent or was accompanied by possession, then he would have a valid
lien; but it would be third priority, subordinated to administra-
tion and wage claims. Now, however, his lien is wholly ineffective
as a statutory lien under section 67 (c). This is true regardless of
whether state law recognizes a priority for landlords' claims, as
the rent claim is given a fifth priority under section 64 because of
the language in section 67 (c) (2). The only qualification that must
be met is that the rent claim be secured by a lien. If it is an un-
secured rent claim, then the ordinary provision of section 64 (a) (5)
prevails and the landlord is entitled only to the priority given him
by state law.
Section 64 (a) (5) was also amended in 1966 by the same legisla-
tion to harmonize its provisions in this respect with the changes
in sections 67 (c) (1) and (2). As amended, there is fifth priority for
"a landlord who is entitled to priority by applicable State law or
who is entitled to priority by paragraph (2) of subdivision (c) of
section 67 of this Act." 38
26ptm. L. No. 89-495, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. § 2 (July 5, 1966).3 7 Bankruptcy Act § 64(a) (5) gave priority for "rent owing to a landlord
who is entitled to priority by applicable State law."
38 See supra note 86.
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VI. TAX LIENS SUBORDINATED
Paragraph (3) of section 67 (c) subordinates every tax lien on
personal property which is not accompanied by possession. The
tax lien apparently includes both federal and state tax liens.
Prior to the 1966 amendments, a possible interpretation was that
section 67 (c) (2) postponed only the federal tax lien on personal
property not accompanied by possession and wholly invalidated
any state tax lien. This interpretation would depend on the
definition of the word "debts" in former section 67 (c) (2). If a
state tax lien was construed as a debt, then it would fall within
the invalidating provision of that section. If it were not deemed
a debt, it would be an effective statutory lien, but subordinated
to administration expenses and wage claims.39 However, under the
new amendment every tax lien-city, state, and federal-on per-
sonal property not accompanied by possession is postponed to
the first two priorities in section 64 (a).40 Thus, in effect, these
liens have a third priority coming after administration expenses
and wage claims but before the priority claims listed in section
64 (a) (3). The purpose for subordination is abundantly clear.
The tax lien is a type of statutory lien from which the bank-
rupt's estate derives no benefit. Most statutory liens arise because
they essentially contribute to the estate, i.e., they enhance the value
of the property upon which they attach. However, the tax lien
arises only because of a delinquency in payments and is quite
detrimental to the estate. A federal tax lien attaches to all the
debtor's property; real or personal, tangible or intangible.41 Thus,
in many instances, where there are tax liens in bankruptcy situa-
tions, they could exhaust the entire estate. While the tax lien
obviously must come ahead of the general body of unsecured
creditors, it was felt that there should be some money available
to the two most needy priorities, administration expenses and
wage claims. The postponement feature is carried forward and
extended to tax liens on personal property not accompanied by
39 See Rochelle v. City of Dallas, 264 F.2d 166 (5th Cir. 1959) ("debts"
does not include city taxes); accord, In re Baron, 165 F. Supp. 186 (D. Conn.
1958). Cf., In re Gordon, 27 REF. J. 85 (1953) (invalidated city, county and
state tax liens on personal property unaccompanied by possession). For fur-ther
discussion, see 4 COLL=E, BA~mu'cy UI 67.281[l] (14th ed. 1954).
40 See S. REa. 1159, note 26 supra, at 2024.
41 INT. RE v. CODE OF 1954, § 6321.
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possession. If either of these two elements is not present, i.e., if
the lien is on real property or if the tax lien is accompanied by
possession, then the subordination feature is not applicable and
the lien will take first, just as any secured creditor would, if it
is otherwise valid under section 67 (c) (1).
VII. PRIoRITY CIRcurY-How RESOLVED
Prior to the 1966 amendments, subordination created quite a
circuity of priority problem. The problem arose when there were
two secured claims on the same property of the same debtor and
bankruptcy ensued. One secured claim was represented by a
federal tax lien or a rent lien which was superior by time or
statute to the other secured claim, a consensual lien, e.g., a chattel
mortgage. The tax or rent lien, although subordinated to the ad-
ministration and wage priorities, would be superior to the con-
sensual lien. The consensual lien was indefeasible in bankruptcy,
that is, absent the tax or rent lien, it was superior to the first two
priorities. Thus, the circle was complete: the statutory lien was
preferred to the consensual lien; the consensual lien was pre-
ferred to the first two priorities, and the first two priorities were
preferred to the tax lien. How to break the circle?
Prior to the 1966 amendment, three decisional approaches
were taken. In one approach, the consensual lien was satisfied
ahead of the other two categories; the rationale was that since the
consensual lien was indefeasible in bankruptcy the tax lien with
its subordination feature should not affect it.4 While this result
may be commendable, it unfortunately ignored the provisions of
other statutes, such as the Internal Revenue Code. For example,
the Internal Revenue Code in this situation may have required
the particular consensual lien to be subordinated to the federal
tax lien. The real effect of preferring the consensual lien to the
federal tax lien once bankruptcy ensued was to ignore non-bank-
ruptcy lien law.
42 New Orleans v. Harrell, 134 F.2d 399 (5th Cir. 1943). Under this ap-
proach, if the tax lien is for $4,000 and a chattel mortgage exists for $4,000
which under lien law is subordinate to the tax lien, and the two priority claims
are $1,000 each, and the property liquidates for $5,000, the mortgagee gets
$4,000, administration expenses get $1,000, and the tax lien and wage claimants
get nothing. See also 4 CoLu, BANaKururcy 67.27(3) (14th ed. 1954).
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A second approach concluded that the order of priority
should be administration and wage claims first, then the tax lien,
and finally the consensual lien.43 This was based on a theory of
subordination by implication, which came from the Bankruptcy
Act, section 67 (c). The court reasoned that, since the Bank-
ruptcy Act subordinated the rent lien, Congress meant also to sub-
ordinate whatever liens were under the rent lien. Thus, since
the rent lien was subordinated to the first two priority claims,
the consensual lien should also be subordinated. The unfortunate
aspect of both the theory and its result was that other statutory
provisions were ignored. The consensual lien would be sub-
ordinated only by a fortuitous happening or occurrence not within
the control of the secured creditor. The secured creditor would
be fully protected only if there was no rent or tax lien in the
bankruptcy proceeding. Usually, the proceeds would be eaten up
by the tax lien, especially if administration expenses and wage
claims were also taken. This result was less than desirable.
A third and more complex method of reaching a more sensible
result was adopted by other courts44 and incorporated into the new
legislation.45 In effect, it first sets aside sufficient money from the
sale of the property involved to satisfy the tax lien. Then the
consensual lien is satisfied to the extent possible from the re-
maining proceeds of the sale. This step in the process has a double
effect. First, it gives recognition to the law outside the Bankruptcy
Act. It does this by recognizing the superiority of the tax lien
over the consensual lien as required by the applicable state or
federal statute. Secondly, by giving the consensual lien whatever
funds remain, it recognizes the system of priorities incorporated
within the Bankruptcy Act itself, i.e., that the consensual lien is
43In re Quaker City Uniform Co., Inc., 238 F.2d 155 (3d Cir. 1956),
followed in In re Einhom Bros., Inc., 272 F.2d 434 (3d Cir. 1959). Under this
approach, the distribution in the case set out supra note 42 would be: $1,000 to
administration expenses, $1,000 to wage claimants, $3,000 for the tax lien, and
nothing for the mortgagee.
44 California State Dep't of Employment v. United States, 210 F.2d 242 (9th
Cir. 1954); In re American Zyploptic Co., Inc., 181 F. Supp. 77 (E.D.N.Y. 1960);
In re Empire Granite Co., 42 F. Supp. 450 (M.D. Ga. 1942) (since this case
was in the fifth circuit, it may be considered of little value because of the
different approach subsequently taken in New Orleans v. Harrell, note 42 supra).
Under this approach, the distribution in the case set out supra note 42
would be: $2,000 for the tax lien, $1,000 for the mortgagee, and $1,000 each for
the priority claimants. See text at note 45 infra.4 Bankruptcy Act § 67(c) (3) as amended PuB. L. No. 89-495, 89th Cong.,
2d Sess. § 4 (July 5, 1966) set out in text at note 16 supra.
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to be paid before any of the priorities listed in section 64 (a) of the
Act. The consensual lienor is now out of the picture. Then a
second step in the process takes place. Former section 67 (c) would
have required that a sufficient amount be taken from the funds
set aside for the tax lien to satisfy the first two priorities in section
64 (a). The money given to the consensual lienor would not be
disturbed. If there are sufficient funds to pay the first two priority
claims, any remaining money would be used to satisfy the tax
lien. If the funds are insufficient to satisfy the first two priority
claims, the tax and consensual liens remain unsatisfied. This two-
step process has the real effect of giving as much substance as
possible to all the law involved, including the Bankruptcy Act and
non-bankruptcy statutes. This approach, taken also under the
new section 67 (c), 46 is a good method, which will achieve equitable
results. Its most desirable feature is that it provides a statutory
provision which resolves the circuity problem, thereby ensuring
uniformity of application throughout the United States. As
mentioned in the Senate Report:
This solution thus avoids the situation where the fortuitous
intercession of a subsequent tax lien may result in little or
nothing being left for the secured creditor as occurred in
Quaker City. At the same time, it prevents a lienor who has
a lien subsequent to a tax lien from receiving more than he
would get if bankruptcy had not occurred.
It should be noted, too, that in a case where there is not
enough to pay the tax lien in full, any deficiency remains a
claim which, under section 64a(4), is entitled to a priority on
the unsecured assets of the estate. In addition, under present
law, tax debts are not dischargeable, and any deficiency re-
mains a claim against the debtor even after bankruptcy.47
VIII. TAX LIENS: TRUSTEE As JUDGMENT CREDITOR
The tax lien must be tested against two parts of section 67 (c).
First, it must meet the provisions and standards in section 67 (c)
(1); if it does, it falls within section 67 (c) (3), provided the lien
is on personal property not accompanied by possession. Thus, the
tax lien must be valid against the trustee under section 67 (c) (1)
4 bid. The actual distribution scheme in terms of dollar amount is set
out note 44 su pra.
47 S. REP No. 1159, supra note 26, at 2022, 2030.
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if it is ever to be valid, even on a subordinated basis under section
67 (c) (3). The effect of requiring reference to section 67 (c) (1) is
to incorporate the provisions in section 70 (c), which was also
amended.48 In connection with the federal tax lien, an important
change was made in section 70 (c) which incorporates the decision
of the Supreme Court in United States v. Speers.49 As a result of
this holding, the trustee in bankruptcy was given the status, or
recognized to have the status, of a judgment creditor so that he
might come within the protective provisions of section 6323 of the
Internal Revenue Code.
Prior to Speers, the federal courts of appeals disagreed on this
point.5 0 As far as the Internal Revenue Code was concerned, a
federal tax lien was valid, even if unrecorded, against everyone
except purchasers, judgment creditors, pledgees, and mortgagees. 1
In order to be valid against these four groups, the Code required
that the tax lien be recorded.5 2 The question then became whether
the trustee in bankruptcy had the position of a judgment creditor.
If he did, an unrecorded federal tax lien prior to bankruptcy was
ineffective against him.5 3 On this point of interpretation, a con-
flict developed.5 4 It was subsequently resolved by the Supreme
Court's decision that the trustee is a judgment creditor.5 5 This
decision was incorporated by amendment in section 70 (c), so that
now the trustee has that status beyond any doubt.5 6 Thus, for the
federal tax lien to be effective even on a subordinated basis within
section 67 (c) (3) it must be valid under section 67 (c) (1) against
48 Pun. L. No. 89-495, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. § 5 (July 5, 1966).
49 382 U.S. 266 (1965).50 See, e.g., Simonson v. Granquist, 287 F.2d 489 (9th Cir. 1961); In re
Fidelity Tube Corp., 278 F.2d 776 (3d Cir. 1960); Brust v. Sturr, 237 F.2d 135(2d Cir. 1956) (each holding that a trustee is not a judgment creditor within
the meaning of the Internal Revenue Code, § 6323). For the view that a trustee
is a judgment creditor within § 6323, see United States v. Speers, supra note 49,
In re Kurtz Roofing Co., 335 F.2d 311 (6th Cir. 1964).
51 INT. Rv. CODE OF 1954, §§6322-23.
52 INT. REV. CoDE OF 1954, § 6323. dm53 Bankruptcy Act § 70(c) provided that the trustee "shall be deemed
vested . .. with all the rights, remedies, and powers of a creditor . . holding a
lien thereon by . .. [legal or equitable proceedings], whether or not such a
creditor actually exists."
54See note 50 supra.55 United States v. Speers 382 U.S. 266 (1965).56 Bankruptcy Act § 70(c), as amended, PuB. L. No. 89-495, 89th Cong., 2d
Sess. § 5 (July 5, 1966); see note 33 supra. For legislative discussion of this
amendment, see S. REP. No. 999 on H.R. 136; S. REP. No. 1159 on -RR. 136,
89th Cong., 2d Sess. § 5 (July 5, 1966); U.S. CoDE CoNG. & AD. NEws 2010-14,
2030-82 (No. 7, Aug. 20, 1966).
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the trustee in bankruptcy. In net result, the federal tax lien must
be recorded prior to bankruptcy in order to meet the validating
features of section 67 (c).
IX. PRESERVING THE LIEN
Finally, section 67 (c) as amended in 1966 carries forward the
right of preservation given the trustee in bankruptcy. It provides
that by order of the court an invalidated statutory lien may be
preserved by the trustee for the benefit of the estate. 57 This is an
extremely important provision because it prevents the stepping up
of junior liens when a senior lien is invalidated. Thus, if the
trustee invalidates a senior lien on property by virtue of the pro-
visions of section 67 (c) and junior liens exist on the same pro-
perty, he may preserve the senior lien to its full extent in order
that the estate be benefited and the junior liens not receive a wind-
fall. If the preservation feature were not included, the junior
liens would step up to first place and presumably take all the
proceeds of sale of the property5 8 By virtue of the preservation
feature the estate receives the proceeds to the extent of the value of
the senior lien. If anything remains after payment of the senior
lien, it goes to the junior lienors.
An additional sentence was put in, however, which was not
in the prior statute. This sentence provides:
A lien not preserved for the benefit of the estate but invali-
dated against the trustee shall be invalid as against all liens
indefeasible in bankruptcy so as to have the effect of pro-
moting liens indefeasible in bankruptcy which would other-
wise be subordinate to such invalidated lien.59
The effect of this statement is that the junior liens will obtain
a windfall in the event that the senior lien, after invalidation, is
not preserved for the benefit of the estate. The necessity of having
this provision in the statute is not clear. Presumably, this result
would have obtained if the trustee did not preserve the lien.
Where there are junior liens and the trustee invalidates the senior
lien, it would seem necessary that he request the court to preserve
57 Bankruptcy Act § 67(c) (2), as amended PuB. L. No. 89-495, 89th Cong.,
2d Sess. § 4 (July 5, 1966).68 See 4 CoLt.um, BAmmEuTcy ff 67.28[2] (14th ed. 1954).
G9 See note 57 supra.
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the lien for benefit of the estate. The point at which such pre-
servation should not take place is not clear.
It can have real effect in a situation similar to that in the
Quaker City case. 60 If a rent lien is involved, a problem could
arise if state law made the rent lien superior to the consensual
lien,61 which is indefeasible in bankruptcy and thus superior to
all the unsecured claims. Under section 67 (c), as amended, the
rent lien is wholly invalidated and the rent claimant has only a
fifth priority under section 64. If section 67 (c) provided nothing
further in this regard, the old circuity problem would still exist,
and presumably in a Quaker City jurisdiction the consensual lien
would be subordinated to the rent lien. Thus, instead of being
subordinated to only the first two priorities of section 64, it would
be subordinated to the first four priorities in this section. The
effect of the above quoted sentence is to ensure not only that
this result does not obtain, but to deny any effect to the rent lien
under section 67 (c). This would prefer the consensual lien,
regardless of state law, and the rent lien would retain only its
section 64 (a) (5) priority. This was mentioned in the Senate Re-
port, which recognized that in some cases the result would be "a
ranking of liens in bankruptcy different from what it would be
apart from bankruptcy .... -62 While the difference was recognized,
it was also pointed out that such a result may well be necessary to
promote and make effective the scheme of distribution contem-
plated by the Bankruptcy Act.63 In effect, therefore, the Quaker
City case will have no further value as precedent.
X. CONCLUSION
In total, the amendments in section 67 are well conceived, and
while there may be some disagreement with the language used,
the intent and application should be fairly clear. It is unfortunate
that section 67 (b) and (c) were not completely rewritten to-
gether so that one need not first look to the validity given by
section 67 (b) and then to subsection (c) to determine which
60ln re Quaker City Uniform Co., Inc., 238 F.2d 155 (3d Cir. 1956); see
note 48 supra.
61 If the applicable state statute so provides.




statutory liens are valid and which are invalid, and which sub-
ordinated. The virtue of the whole amendment is exemplified by
the fact that many prior problems which would have required
solution by the Supreme Court have been resolved and that the
litigation aspect will be eliminated or at least much reduced.
From the point of view of the individual holding a statutory
lien, the essential feature of the new amendment is that he must
make sure his lien is properly perfected to be valid against sub-
sequent bona fide purchasers. If so perfected, it will not be sub-
ject to attack by a trustee in bankruptcy.
The second basic feature of this new statute is that all tax liens
on personal property not accompanied by possession are validated
as long as perfection under state or federal law is complied with,
but they are subordinated to the first two priorities of section
64 (a). Additionally, if there is a conflict of lien which formerly
would have created a circuity problem, the resolution of the prob-
lem is now defined by statute. Finally, an added advantage of the
latest amendment is the incorporation of a definition of the term
"statutory lien." This should free courts from unnecessary dis-
cussion and the risk of misinterpretation.
Section 67 (b) and (c) was one of the most complicated
sections of the Bankruptcy Act. It is a compliment to the drafters
of the amendments that these provisions were drafted so well,
and passage of the amendments by both houses of Congress speaks
well of their persuasive powers.
